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The language of the decisions will indicate to coming generations of
legislators and judges that if a particular activity can be classified as
a privilege, it can be conditioned. The statute's indirect effect will con-
tinue to be subordinated to its express wording and constitutional rights
will be constantly placed in jeopardy. Should the courts continue their
present course, any right may be abolished by the circuitous method
of conditioning some necessary privilege upon its surrender. This dan-
ger becomes more acute with the realization that the courts consider
rights to be only those enumerated in the Constitution; everything else,
no matter how essential to the individual's economic, social, or personal
well-being, is a privilege which can be conditioned. Not until the issue
is recognized for what it is-the basic freedoms of the individual bal-
anced against the interests of the state-will the mandates of the Con-
stitution be properly considered in judicial scrutiny of legislative action
against real or supposed threats from unpopular minority groups.98
AN ANALYSIS OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL
LEGISLATION
Preoccupation with the amazingly rapid expansion of suburban
areas, 1 usually achieved through the process of large-scale subdivid-
ing,2 may easily obscure perception of the haphazard manner of the
typical city's movement to its outer limits. The most unfortunate aspect
of such uncontrolled growth is the failure to realize its detrimental
affect upon the health, safety, and economic well-being of the com-
munity.
(dissent). First Amendment liberties should occupy their "preferred place," not
only in calm times, but especially in times of crisis and peril.
98. When it is granted tat many direct conditions imposed upon governmental
privileges operate as indirect abridgements of recognized constitutional rights, and,
further, that many activities which bear the courts' label of privilege are, in reality,
so important to the individual as to assume the status of a right, grave doubts must
be cast upon the constitutional validity of the current procedures being employed
against undesirable groups. See SHARP, The Old Constitution, 20 U. OF CnI. L. R.,
529, 534-44 (1953).
1. For a discussion of the post-war construction boom, see Fortune, June 1950,
p. 67, col. 1. The results of the 1950 census show that the greatest increase in popula-
tion in the past decade occurred in suburbs of metropolitan areas. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, POPULATION OF URBANIZED AREAS (DEPT. CommERcE P-C-3, No. 2, 1950).
2. Subdividing is usually defined as division of a parcel of land into a specified
number of lots for the purpose of sale or building. See notes 99-102 infra and accom-
panying text. See also Appendix, p. 574, col. 11 infra.
NOTES
Concentration of the dangers to health, safety and general well-
being in a given residential area is often described by the term "slum."
Slums result, of course, from numerous diverse elements,3 among them
factors affecting the quality of the land itself,4 such as swamps and
periodic flooding,5 and the development of surrounding areas, often
industrial, 6 which renders residential use undesirable. Also contributing
to slum development is the lack or insufficiency of such basic utilities
as water and sanitary sewers, 7 and occasionally, the absence of other
physical improvements, typically sidewalks and curbs.
Unregulated subdividing which results in an excessive supply of
lots may also threaten the economic stability of the community and
3. One noted authority lists six slum-inducing factors. For a complete discussion
of these elements see FORD, SLUMS AND HOUSING C. 19 (1936).
4. Listed first among the causative factors by Ford is "physical factors," which
is said to comprise topography, land configuration, climate, and natural resources. In
discussing the relation of slum areas to these factors. Ford states: "Many cities show
slums on the edges of swamps, in hollows . . . on hillsides where street systems and
housing were not conformed to topography." Id. at 444. The causes of blight, which
is usually considered the first step towards a slum area were outlined for the Presidents
Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership. Included among the secondary
causes were swampy soil and steep hillsides. PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILD-
ING AND HOME OWNERSHIP. SLUMS, LARGZ-ScALE HOUSING AND DECENTRALIZATION,
42-44 as cited in FORD, op. cit. .supra note 3, at 447. Similarly, a newspaper editorial,
in discussing the now flooded areas which were sold by wildcat subdividers, stated that
such areas "in any sensible bystanders eyes are a blight on the community and deserve
to be stopped." Louisville Courier-Journal, March 15, 1953, p. 17, col. 4.
5. Certainly every buyer of a home site should thoroughly investigate the topog-
raphy of the territory of which his land is a part and cursory consideration suggests
that today's buyer would always conduct such an examination and would therefore not
purchase such property. Yet, such ignorance remains and is vividly demonstrated by
the situation involving Louisville, Kentucky. Subdivision control is successfully being
avoided by subdividers and a local newspaper reports that: "During the last 14 months,
many wildcat lots have been sold off in the County's wettest, worst-drained flatlands.
The early March rains flooded scores of families." Louisville Courier-Journal, March
15, 1953, p. 17, col. 4. This would seem to substantiate the generalization advanced by
the American Planning Institute that "'[p]erhaps the majority of purchasers of lots
in such wild-cat subdivisions are ignorant of the responsibilities involved in making lots
suitable for healthful building."' Statement of the AMERICAN PLANNING INSTITUTE,
quoted in, MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDMSIONs, 25 (1949).
6. The usual situation involves subdividing of land for residential purposes which
is 'hear or adjacent to railroad tracks or industry, and is better suited to industrial
purposes. Such land seldom becomes fully developed, and often develops into a slum
area, while also adversely affecting land further out, which might originally have been
suitable for residential purposes. See FORD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 444.
7. The relationship between the physical improvements, represented by sanitary
sewers, water, electricity, gas, and storm sewer facilities, and the development of slums
in areas of such high density as the urban residential district cannot be doubted. "Char-
acteristics of slum areas are types of house design-now outmoded, inadequate provision
for sanitation, lighting, heating, obsolescent fixtures. . . " FoRD op. cit. supra note 3,
at 12. Lack of basic improvements is generally encompassed by the term bad housing.
"Bad housing, as a matter of practical fact, is profoundly detrimental to health. .... 
Winslow, Health and Housing, AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH Assoc., HOUSING FOR
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may eventually result in a slum area. Excessive subdividing causes tax
delinquency, 8 impairments of taxable values of adjacent property,9 and
increased per capita cost for police, fire and health protection. 10 Since
these factors, when existing in one area, clearly constitute a severe
economic drain on the community," it is not surprising that excessive
subdividing is a recognized primary cause' 2 of blighted areas, 1 3 which
are commonly, but not invariably, the first stage of slum development. 14
Summarily, slum-inducing conditions arise from physical factors
involving the instant and surrofinding land, and from the need for
improvements upon the land, while economic instability 5 arises pri-
marily from excessive residential subdividing.' 6 While the elements
involving the development of contiguous land and excessive residential
subdividing are usually considered zoning problems because of the use
HEALTH 9 (1941). The standards of quality relating to these improvements presents
more difficult problems. See notes 132-137 infra and accompanying text.
8. The extent of such delinquency is vividly reflected by the situation in Chicago,
where in 1946 there existed 250,000 parcels of tax delinquent land. For an excellent
article on this point see Aschman, Chronically Tax Delinquent Land in Cook County,
25 LAND ECONOMICS 240 (1946), in which the author stated that such delinquency
unquestionably resulted from excessive subdividing.
9. See SEGOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 479 (1st ed. 1941).
10. Thousands of dollars are required to service these vacant subdivisions. Indeed,
the cost of assessment alone was over $1,000,000 a year in Cook County in 1946. Asch-
man, supra note 8, at 243. See also MONCHow, REAL ESTATE SUDIVIDING C. 1 (1939);
SEGOE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 497.
11. See HARVARD CITY PLANNING STUDIES XII, WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND
SLUMS 69 (1938).
12. The Presidents Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership con-
cluded that one of the primary causes of blighted areas was the "'uneconomic use of
land.'" In urban areas such blight results when the "'wrong type of development is
attempted, as too large an area zoned for business or apartment houses, or an over-
supply of building lots put on the market.'" PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILD-
ING AND HOME OWNERSHIP, SLUMS, LARGE-SCALE HOUSING AND DECFNTRALIZATION,
111, 42-44, quoted in FORD, SLUMS AND HOUSING 446 (1936).
13. Definition of the term blighted area, like slum, is not without considerablc
difficulty. Almost every writer on the general subject has established a different defini-
tion. Clearly, however, the term does have economic connotations and is usually con-
sidered in that context. See WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 3 et seq. (1938).
14. See FORD, SLUMS AND HOUSING 446 (1936).
15. Indeed, excessive subdividing has often resulted in a more direct drain on
public funds, and accordingly an increase in city taxation, the precise amount of which
is usually readily determinable. Thus, where the city finances improvements through
bonds which are to be retired by special assessments on the lots, and the lots remain
vacant, the city is forced to pay the ultimate bill. See CORNICK, PREMATURE SUBDIVI-
SION OF URBAN LANDS 290 (1938); FEDERAL HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY.
SUGGESTED LAND SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 4 (1952).
16. The extent of excessive subdividing during the boom of the twenties is demon-
strated by statistics which show that by 1930 there were 175,000 vacant lots in both
Cleveland and Chicago, enough in Los Angeles to accommodate an 85% increase in
population, and 224,092 vacant lots in Detroit. SEGOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION
514-515 (lst ed. 1941).
546
NOTES
aspect involved, they are commonly associated with subdividing and
suggest the need for a determination of how they may best be attacked.
Subdivision control, like zoning,'1  must be recognized as a tooP S
of city planning.' 9 It has sought, in the past, to guide development by
establishing standards for the desirable transition of land.20 Meanwhile,
use control, the most frequently recognized aspect of zoning, has evolved
from a device initiated to preserve use and land values21 into a recog-
17. An excellent discussion of the inter-relation between zoning and planning may
be found in a case involving subdivision control. The court rejected the contention that
zoning and planning are a single conception and embrace identical areas, and con-
cluded that zoning was but a part of the broader term of city planning. Mansfield &
Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 149, 198 Atl. 225, 228 (1938).
18. Both zoning and subdivision control are methods of effectuating the proper
development of the community. Such physical development is usually represented by
a master plan which is established to serve as a guide. Zoning, subdivision control,
prevention of building in right-of-ways, and the programing of public works represent
the four major methods of carrying out comprehensive city planning. SEGoE, LOCAL
PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 27 (2d ed. 1948).
19. While considerable writings have been devoted to defining the term city plan-
ning, one of the most concise and comprehensive statements emerges from a New Jersey
zoning decision. "Municipal planning, in a word,tis the accommodation, through unity
in construction, of the variant interests seeking expression in the local physical life
to the interest of the community as a social unit. Planning is a science and an art
concerned with land economics and land policies in terms of social and economic better-
ment." Grosso v. Board of Adjustment, 137 N.J.L. 630, 631, 61 A.2d 167, 168 (1948).
Recognition of the vital relation of city planning to slums has evolved rapidly since
the 1930's. In 1936, one writer observed. "[w]hen one considers city planning as a
device for slum prevention, one notes that in writings on housing little specific attention
has so far been paid to the problem. City planners have dealt with the rehabilitation
of blighted districts or of slums, but in so doing have been dealing with curative rather
than preventative aspects of the problem." FORD, SLUMS AND HOUSING 495 (1936).
Today, however, recognition of the preventive aspects of city planning, as effectuated
through zoning and subdivision control, is established. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE INFORM.fATION REPORT NO. 10, CON-
SIDERATIONS IN SURnIVISION CONTROL 1 (1950). The realization of the necessary role
of subdivision control as a preventative measure is certainly not limited, today, to
planning officials. Louisville, Kentucky, which is striving to clean up its slum areas
through either rehabilitation or redevelopment, has 'also been recently prompted to
reconsider its subdivision control regulations as a vital aspect of the entire program.
See Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 21, 1953, p. 6, col. 1-2.
20. See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
21. These early zoning cases largely consisted of ordinances classifying certain
areas as residential and industrial, and often prohibiting specific industrial uses within
the residential area. While such uses were not classified as nuisances per se, Reinman
v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 174 (1915) ; Ex Parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220,
232, 118 Pac. 714, 719 (1911), the cases are clearly based on the harm to surrounding
land values, although ostensibly often relying on the broad phrase "health, safety, and
general welfare." In the Rehiman case, which involved an ordinance forbidding the
existence of a livery stable within a designated area, the court pointed out that the
ordinance was passed in belief that such stables were damaging to the "prosperity
in that vicinity," which consisted of the "most valuable real estate in the entire state."
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 174 (1915). Similarly, in Ex parte
Quong Wo, where a laundry was being operated in a zone classified as residential, the
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nized means for guiding development by assuring future use consistent
with the general welfare.22 The intimate relationship between these two
implements is readily evidenced by comparing subdivision regulations,
concerning the necessary improvements for the land, and the less preva-
lent aspect of zoning which regulates height, area, and bulk of buildings23
upon the property. Both devices tend to determine how the transition
from one use to another shall be effectuated so as to assure desirable
change.24 Hence, any dichotomy, however intriguing, that classifies
zoning as the determinant of what use can be made and subdivision
control as determining the standards for development is an over-simplifi-
cation of existing relationships. 25  The current question, however, is
whether subdivision control can and should also be directed towards
controlling use in an effort to combat the evils of excessive and inappro-
priately located residential subdividing.
The ideal subdivision offers numerous advantages to the buyer of a
home or home site.26 Included among these are: (1) the ability to antici-
pate the general character of the surrounding area; (2) appreciation of
the lot sizes and topography of the immediately contiguous land; (3)
court observed that the ordinance "was undoubtedly [designed] to protect such por-
tions of the city of Los Angeles as are devoted principally to residence purposes from
the dangers and discomfort attendant upon the operation of certain kinds of business"
which, while not necessarily nuisances per se, have always been recognized as proper
subjects of police regulation. Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220, 232, 118 Pac. 714,
719 (1911). Additional cases demonstrating this point are Hadacheck v. City of Los
Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick manufacturing) ; Ex parte Montgomery, 163 Cal.
457, 125 Pac. 1070 (1912) (lumber yard).
22. One of the earliest cases recognizing the full breadth of zoning was the Zahn
decision, where the court observed, "[t]he power of the city council to zone is not
limited in our opinion to the protection of established districts. . . . Zoning in its best
sense looks, not only backward to protect districts already established, but forward
to aid in the development of new districts according to a comprehensive plan having
as its basis the welfare of the city as a whole." Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195
Cal. 497, 503, 234 Pac. 388, 395 (1925), aff'd 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
23. This aspect of zoning seeks to assure proper density of population, sufficient
light, and adequate open space around buildings through devices which regulate size,
area, and placement of such buildings. The devices employed often include height
limitations, set-back lines and yard requirements. See Comments, 66 HA.av. L. Ray.
1051 (1953); 60 YALE L.J. 506 (1951).
24. Such subdivision regulations require certain utility installations and other
improvements, typically sidewalks, curbs and gutters. Obviously these seek to prepare
satisfactorily the land for future building, while bulk regulations immediately follow to
establish certain regulations as to how the building may be placed upon the property.
25. See Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1226 (1952).
26. "Recent years have brought startling changes to the business of subdividing
real estate. The selling of lots has been merged with the building of houses until today
the buyer acquires a compete new home." McMIcHAa., op. cit. supra note 5, at 1. "The
trend today is toward the complete package of improved lot with streets, utilities, and
house." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Max Wehrly, Exceutive
Director of the Urband Land Institute.
NOTES
participation in restrictive covenant agreements ;27 (4) expected develop-
ment of neighborhood shopping districts in reasonably sizable subdivi-
sions; and, (5) adequate streets and other improvements. 28  Control
over subdividing serves the dual purpose of preserving these benefits for
the buyer, while insuring the community of sound physical growth.29
Significantly, the subdivision industry has not voiced disapproval
of regulation on the grounds that it represents an undue governmental
interference with business.30 The organized industry reflects an apprecia-
tion for the desirability of social control to avoid economic waste8 1 and
protect the ethical subdivider and the reputation of the industry from
the irresponsible "wildcat" subdivider. However, while agreeing in prin-
ciple, the industry often does not approve of the improvement require-
ments which have been established to effectuate the control program.
Its common assertion that compliance with established regulations often
prohibits erection of low cost housing, 2 suggests that a balance must
27. The important role which protective covenants play in assuring individual
property maximum protection against inharmonious land use is well recognized. The
F.H.A. in its General Advice on Protective Covenants stated, "'[p]rotective covenants
are essential to the sound development of proposed residential areas. Covenants properly
prepared and legally sound contribute to a neighborhood and to the maintenance of
value levels through the regulation of type, size and placement of buildings, lot size,
reservation of easement, and prohibition of nuisances...."' Quoted in FEDERAL Hous-
ING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, SUGGESTED LAND SUBDISION REGULATIONS 53 (1952).
28. See notes 53-57 infra and accompanying text.
29. See Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 167, 106 N.E.2d 503, 506 (1952).
30. One of the best known books on subdividing, written from the subdivider's
viewpoint, reflects this feeling: "Government domination is not relished by the American
people; yet here is a field in which the average citizen does not seem to be fearful that
any of his rights are being abridged ... " McMicnEAL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS
30 (1949).
31. Accordingly, consultants for the National Association of Home Builders stated:
"The progressive community builders and Home Builders today accept the desirability
and necessity of municipal subdivision regulations." Communication to the INDIANA
LAW JOUINAL from Max Wehrly, Executive Director of the Urban Land Institute.
Similarly, Guy Rush, former chairman of the Subdividing and Homebuilders Division
of the California Real Estate Association, after making a nation wide survey, con-
cluded: ".... [R]eal estate activity, even when conducted by the most conservative
and ethical operators requires some common means of direction if great economic loss
is not to be entailed. . . . The conclusion is that subdivision regulation, therefore, is
not only necessary but also desirable."' Quoted in MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUB-
DIVISIONS 28-29 (1949).
32. The Executive Director of the Urban Land Institute, which is the consultant
body for the National Association of Home Builders, after stating that the progressive
builders accept the desirability and necessity of municipal subdivision regulations, con-
tinued: "Their chief quarrel with these regulations has been directed against those cities
which have adopted excessive provisions or unreasonable requirements which the de-
veloper must meet in order to comply. These include, for instance, such items as
excessive widths on roadway pavements on purely local streets; heavy duty construc-
tion on local streets .... ; installation of over sized utilities at the developer's expense
to serve property beyond his development; . . . and similar items." Communication to
the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Max S. Wehrly, Executive Director of the Urban
Land Institute.
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be achieved between the admitted desirability of avoiding slum condi-
tions and the equally significant social benefits of sufficient low cost
housing. 3
Assuredly, it would be desirable if satisfactory direction could be
achieved without governmental control by the subdivision industry and
buyers. The industry, whose speculative practices3 4 in the booming
twenties 5 underscored the control problem36 can measurably improve
present conditions by seeking to eliminate the "wildcat" subdivider whose
only aim is the greatest possible profit.37 While the industry, not only
in its code of ethics38 but in representative literature vows to comply
with both the letter and spirit of the law, 9 no specific content has been
imbued into these broad statements, nor do any sanctions within the
industry suggest themselves. 40 Indeed, the industry, in its avowed
attempt to satisfy low cost housing needs would apparently voluntarily
establish only the most minimal standards.4 1 The buyer, of course, by
33. See notes 123-137 infra and accompanying text.
34. For a detailed account of such practices in large metropolitan areas see
CORNICK, PROBLEMS CREATED BY PREMATURE SUBDIVISION C. 1 (1938); MoNcHoW, REAL
ESTATE SUBDIVIDING C. 1 (1939).
35. One noted planning authority, as late as 1941, felt the subdivider still was
almost exclusively a "profit" animal. See SEGOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION
495 (1st ed. 1941).
36. During the boom, however, the unfortunate results were evidently not readily
forseen. Indeed, the subdivider was at the time eulogized by one writer as the "magician
of modern times .... The subdivider is truly the advance guard of civic progress . . .
the unsung and unromantic hero of modern civilization." Malbrough, The Magician,
Economist, Aug. 22, 1925, p. 25, quoted in MONCHow, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING 159
(1939).
37. The subdivision industry is well aware of the "wildcat" subdivider and has
made every effort to eliminate him from recognized organizations. Accordingly, one
representative for the industry stated: ". . . [Y]ou will, of course, find a few operators
in these fields attempting to sidestep all regulations. This is not unique in this industry,
as I am sure you are aware .... normally, however, you will not find them within the
recognized organizations." (emphasis added) Communication to the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL from Max Wehrly, Executive Director of the Urban Land Institute.
38. "'(F) Members shall comply both in spirit and letter with rules and regula-
tions prescribed by law and government agencies for the health, safety and progress
of the community."' CODE OF ETHICS OF NATIONAL AssocIATION OF HOME BUILDERS
OF THE UNITED STATES, quoted in MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS 336 (1949).
39. The industry, in fact, realizes that further regulations, some of which will
be even more restrictive, will probably be imposed in years to come. "When the ,
restrictions are not unreasonable they will be welcomed by the operator, who will pass
on their cost to the ultimate consumer." Id. at 10 (1949).
40. This is probably due, in part, to the nature of the subdivision business, which
thrives during boom periods and disappears in less prosperous times. Hence the sub-
divider is the real estate man or the contractor most of the time, turning to subdividing
only in selected business periods. This factor, coupled with the individual owner who
turns subdivider, by dividing his own property, tends to produce a divergent group
and necessarily loosely bound industry. For an interesting discussion on this point,
pertaining especially to Wisconsin, see MELLI, SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN WISCONSIN,
44 et seq. (1953).
41. This is reflected primarily in relation to statutes requiring the subdivider to
NOTES
demanding higher quality and by making a thorough examination of
the property before buying might thereby better the situation. Unfor-
tunately, however, the buyer, even when he is in a strong bargaining
position, is usually woefully unaware of the necessities for an improved
lot 42 and is often prompted to buy because he believes he can resell for
a quick profit, especially in boom periods.
4 3
Inherent in any otherwise effective control by the industry, the
buyer, or both is the severe limitation of piecemeal planning.44 Hence,
governmental control of the subdivision process 45 has become, especially
in the past three decades,46 increasingly prevalent. While considerable
indirect influence is exerted by the Federal Housing Administration
which demands compliance with certain standards before an insured
mortgage can be obtained, 47 the most substantial control emanates from
install improvements, such as sidewalks, curbs, gutters, gas mains and sanitary sewers,
by protestations as to the number of requirements and the specifications therefor. See
notes 123-137 infra and accompanying text.
42. See note 5 supra.
43. One survey of seventy-three prominent subdividers resulted in a finding that
"considerably" over 50% of the buyers purchased lots for their own home sites rather
than for investment or speculation. From a survey by the NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF
REAL ESTATE BOARDS, cited in McMicHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS 19 (1949).
44. The realization that the industry cannot possibly adequately plan was evi-
denced in a report made as the result of a nation-wide survey. See note 31 supra.
45. The first attempts at scientific planning emerged in the early 19th century.
One of the most comprehensive attempts was made in 1811 in the city of New York
where the entire area of Manhattan Island was divided into streets and blocks which
allowed room for only extremely narrow residential lots. Unfortunately, this sizable
effort resulted in an over concentration of population and inadequate light for resi-
dences. See FoRD, SLUMs AND HOUSING C. 8 (1936). For a thorough, but brief, dis-
cussion of planning history see SEaGoE, LOCAL PLANNING ADIINIsTRATION c. 1 (1st ed.
1941).
46. The first rush in subdivision legislation was immediately preceded and un-
doubtedly induced by the speculative practices of the booming twenties. By 1941 at
least thirty-two states had enacted provisions, varying tremendously in quality, to control
subdividing. See LAUTNER, SUBDIVISION REGULATION 317-342 (1941). In the past 12
years legislation in this area has been prolific, with every state but Vermont now having
a statute. Additionally, the great majority of the statutes existing in 1941 have been
substantially revised. See Appendix, p. 574 infra. Moreover, at least three states, Mas-
sachusetts, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, presently have new statutes under con-
sideration.
47. The Federal Housing Administration under the National Housing Act of 1934
provides mortgage insurance to private lending institutions for loans on privately owned
homes built by private builders. In order to qualify the subdivision for future mort-
gage insurance, the subdivider must meet certain specifications as established by the
F.H.A. This is important to the subdivider because some purchasers will not be able
to buy without getting an F.H.A. insured mortgage. The percentage of subdividers
that seek F.H.A. approval has never been established, but one writer states that the
"vast majority of them do." MCMICHEaL, RAL ESTATE SUBDIVSIONS 140 (1949).
While it may be agreed that a sizable portion of all subdividers seek F.H.A. approval,
the real impact of this government agency cannot be evaluated without determining
the type of requirements it imposes on the subdivider. One recent investigator of this
problem determined, from extensive research, that in Wisconsin the F.H.A., while
examining a sizable number, exerted very little or no influence on the development
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state enabling statutes48 which empower local planning authorities to
promulgate regulations consistent with their provisions.49 Most cases 0
of most subdivisions. MELLI, SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN WISCONSIN 67 (1953). Accord-
ingly, Byron Hanke, Chief of the Land Planning Division of F.H.A., stated that "'it
is the policy of each of the F.H.A. state or regional offices to require that subdividers
applying for approval of a subdivision as a basis for the issuance of F.H.A. insur-
ance observe the requirements of local subdivision regulations where they exist. It will
rarely occur that local subdivision regulations are less restrictive than minimum require-
ments of F.H.A., and the latter would only be applied in the consideration of a pro-
posed subdivision plat when no local regulations are in effect.'" Byron Hanke, Chief
of the Land Planning Division of F.H.A. as quoted in a communication to the INDIANA
LAW JOURNAL from Paul Middleton, Division of Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelop-
ment of the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Hence, substantial influence will
only result in those areas without local regulations in effect, which is about one half
of American cities. See note 112 infra and accompanying text. The F.H.A. standards
are dealt with in LAND PLANNING BULLETIN No. 3. Various aspects of such standards
have been criticized as being unsound. More specifically, criticism is directed towards
F.H.A. approval of roll curbs with 4y2 feet sidewalks adjacent. The same report,
however, commends the F.H.A. for generally requiring sanitary sewers, graded and
surfaced streets, and adequate water supply. AMERICAN SocIETY OF PLANNING OFFI-
CIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY REPORT No. 38 INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS
AS REQUIRED IN SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 2 (1952).
Two other aspects of F.H.A. influence on the subdivision problem merit considera-
tion. First, without doubt the F.H.A. has exerted a strong educational influence through
its publications regarding the problem and the first hand counsel available to subdividers
from the state and regional offices. Typical, and perhaps their best publication yet, is
the booklet, SUGGESTED LAND SUBnIVISIONS REGULATIONS, which was published by the
FEDERAL HOUSING AND HOME FINANCE AGENCY, of which F.H.A. is a part, in 1952 and is
available from the Superintendent of Documents.
Second, the F.H.A., before approving subdivisions, "makes analysis of market
demands for property" involved. "There is also obtained from time to time and as
need for it arises rather complete market analysis performed by personnel trained in
obtaining and analyzing market data." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from Shirley Wilcox, Director of Indianapolis, Indiana Division of F.H.A. This is
evidently the practice throughout the United States. See F.H.A. CIcuLR. No. 5, 1937,
cited in MoNciaow, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING 191 (1939). Potentially, if the F.H.A.
will actually not approve a subdivision where a flooded market appears, this repre-
sents an excellent method of combatting excessive subdividing.
48. The vast majority of statutes are permissive, giving the local authority power
to create subdivision regulations if the community desires. A few states, however, have
statutes which demand that all plats be approved by the local planning authority before
being recorded. E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 50-2502 to 50-2503a (Supp. 1951); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. 11-608 (4947) ; ORE. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 95-1310 (1940) ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 9161 (1938); Wis. STAT. § 236.06 (1951); WYO. COmP. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-1102 (1945).
49. These statutes, although dealing with plats, should not be confused with those
statutes existing in many states which establish the technical standards, i.e., surveying
requirements, type of paper on which the plat is drawn, etc., which must be complied
with before a plat will be accepted for record.
50. The only possible exception is a notable California decision. This case involved
requirements commanding the subdivider to restrict certain areas for the planting of
trees and shrubbery and to dedicate a 10 foot strip to widen a highway adjacent to the
subdivision, and certain other requirements. The state had passed a "Map Act" which
authorized cities to control subdividing, and also had given Los Angeles subdivision
control powers through the city charter. Both of these legislative acts had been dis-
tinctly interpreted to demand the adoption of a master plan before an area could be
regulated. The master plan had not been completed and did not cover the area under
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reflect the need for the local authority to act within the scope 51 and
through the procedures established by state action.5 2
Since most local programs can be no more effective than the statu-
tory powers provided, the necessity for statutes affording sufficient control
consideration; yet, the court stated that "subdivision design and improvement obviously
include conformance to neighborhood planning and zoning, and it may properly be said
that the formulation and acceptance of the uniform conditions in the development of
the district constitute the practical adoption of a master plan. . . ." Ayers v. City Council
of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 41, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949).
Additionally, there was no specific authorization in either the Map Act or the city
charter for passage of an ordinance governing dedication of land under these circum-
stances and accordingly, none had been passed by the city. Yet, the court upheld the
action of the planning authority in refusing to approve the subdivision until the sub-
divider had complied with the requirements established by 'this same planning authority.
One section of the "Map Act" specifically stated: "In case there is no local ordinance,
the governing body may, as a condition precedent ... require streets and drainage ways
properly located and of adequate width, but may make no other requirements." CAL.
Bus.-PRoF. CODE § 11551 (1951). Admittedly the requirements here exacted were not
all included within the above exceptions, yet the court in a very significant opinion
stated: "Where as here no specific restriction or limitation on the city's power is con-
tained in the Charter, and none forbidding the particular conditions is included either
in the Subdivision Map Act or the City ordinances, it is proper to conclude that condi-
tions are lawful which are not inconsistent with the Map Act and the ordinances. . ....
(emphasis added) Ayers v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, supra at 37, 207
P.2d at 5. This conclusion, that anything not specifically forbidden can be required,
even without an ordinance, if consistent with the general theory of the Act and Charter,
gives the planning authority tremendous power, and does not satisfactorily warn the
subdivider of what restrictions he will be forced to comply with upon subdividing.
See also Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App.2d 919, 228 P2d. 847 (1951) (was
an ordinance here, however).
51. Commissioners Ct. v. Jester Div. Co., 211 Ark 28, 199 S.W.2d 1004 (1947);
Lewis v. City Council of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 433, 168 N.W. 188 (1910) (could not
demand grading since statute referred only to direction and width of streets); State
of Missouri ex rel. Strother v. Chase, 42 Mo. App. 343 (1890) (could not require
specifications as to alleys, since statute applied only to streets) ; Magnolia Development
Co. v. Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89 A.2d. 664 (1952) (must act specifically within scope);
In re Lake Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 913, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931)
(could not force installation of water system when statute applied only to streets, light
and air).
52. The city tried to force the subdivider to install gutters, curbs and sidewalks,
improvements which were clearly authorized by the statute, before granting approval
of the subdivision. The court held the subdivider did not have to comply, since the
ordinance requiring such improvements had not been passed until after the subdivider
had applied. Magnolia Development Co. v. Coles, 10 N.J. 223, 89 A.2d 664 (1952).
In another recent case the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that since the local
planning authority had never finally adopted a town plan, the subdivider could not be
forced to comply with certain parts of a tentative plan before meriting approval of
the planning board. Lordship Park Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of
Stratford, 137 Conn. 84, 75 A.2d 379 (1950). Contra: Ayers v. City Council of City
of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). Finally, in a case which involved
an ordinance requiring building lines, the court held that although the statute author-
ized such requirements, the city, since it had not created a planning commission, was
precluded from effectuating such an ordinance. City of Stuttgart v. Strait, 212 Ark.
126, 205 S.W.2d 35 (1947). Hence the courts have been alert in requiring compliance
with the procedural requirements, which serve to warn the subdivider of the sub-
stantive requirements and also define the channels for application to the planning com-
mission, appeal and other safeguards.
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methods to achieve the types of subdivisions desired is essential. An
accurate evaluation of existing statutes requires an examination of the
powers afforded in the context of the factors causing the undesirable
social and economic harms associated with subdividing, coupled with the
realization that the necessity for eliminating each factor, and perhaps
the ability to do so under the police power, must be determined by
reference to the severity of the resultant harms. These harms, which
involve danger to health, safety, economic instability, increased taxes
and aesthetic values, represent divergent interests of varying import.
Once the necessity for eliminating any given undesirable factor has
been evaluated, the means utilized must be examined to assure that the
desired end can be thereby attained, and if so, that satisfactory pro-
cedures will be employed. More specifically, the marginal inquiry will
be whether subdivision control can be satisfactorily employed to directly
control use in order to alleviate the harms resulting from the factors
concerning bad location and excessive subdividing, which evidently have
been unsatisfactorily controlled through zoning.
The earlier statutes,53 still the only laws in sixteen states,5 4 which
were aimed mainly at street patterns,55 represent the accepted "how
develop" of the traditional subdividing-zoning dichotomy and are
patently inadequate to achieve the other benefits desired. 5 Substantial
progress is indicated by the enactment in thirty-two states of statutes
requiring physical improvements on the land at the subdivider's expense.5T
53. Almost all states have a separate act for subdivision control, although the
same body often is responsible for both zoning and subdividing. Of the 47 states having
subdivision statutes, 37 vest control in a planning commission or board, while the other
10 vest authority in the local governing body. See Appendix, p. 574 in-fra.
54. See Appendix, p. 574 col. III, infra.
55. See Appendix, p. 574 infra. While all statutes there reported authorize control
over streets, such control is sometimes limited to assuring that the streets in the new
subdivision meet those of the contiguous property. These street statutes, moreover,
do not generally authorize the local authority to require grading or surfacing of the
streets.
56. This is not to infer that comprehensive street statutes, properly administered
by the local authority, serve no useful purpose. Indeed, control over traffic facilities
is of prime importance for the safety of those within the instant subdivision as well
as for the convenience and welfare of the entire community. Ideal design for such
streets in new areas is briefly but satisfactorily outlined by the NATIONAL CoMMnIr '
FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, with the cooperation of nationally known organizations, in BuILD-
ING TRAFFIC SAFETY INTO RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS. This is available from 20 N.
Wacker Drive, Chicago 6, Illinois.
57. See Appendix, p. 574, col. III infra. Two of these statutes provide only for
grading or paving of streets. NEv. REV. STAT. § 14-115 (1943) ; Wis. STAT. § 236.143
(1951). Notably, in those states which have several statutes, one each for city and
county, or several according to the population of the city or county, the requirements
for improvements may vary from statute to statute within the state. These improve-
ments must be installed before the plat will be approved by the planning authority.
Twenty-two of these states provide that a surety bond guaranteeing completion will
554
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The causation factors-physical impairments in the instant land,
incompatible development of surrounding land, necessity of improve-
ments, excessive subdividing-are all variously affected by this require-
ment.
These statutes, still reflecting the "how develop" approach, obviously
eradicate the dangers to health and safety arising from lack of improve-
ments,r8 while serving to indirectly alleviate the problems of residential
subdividing in excess and in incompatible surroundings. Since installation
of utilities and other improvements necessitates expenditure of sizable
sums,"0 the subdivider will be considerably more certain before subdi-
viding that home buyers await completion of the project.60 However,
excessive subdividing, while somewhat abated, will continue, especially
in boom periods. Similarly, lots in undesirable locations, due to sur-
rounding uses, can only be sold for minimal prices and the increased
cost will substantially reduce the subdividing of such areas. However,
inherent latent impairments in the instant land are virtually unaffected
by improvement requirements, unless the undesirable quality is solid
rock, which would necessitate prohibitive expenditures for utility
installation.
Power to cope with swampy or seasonally flooded land, which is
intimately associated with health, is explicit in at least two statutes 1
and has been rightly suggested, by judicial decision, as being implicit
within the remaining statutes.62 Significantly, this element is similar to
the improvement factor, since it is directed at assuring desirable develop-
ment by establishment of minimum standards. Hence, land that is, for
suffice for approval. The American Society of Planning Officials warns that these
bond sections have not always served satisfactorily and that the provisions of these
sections should be complete and specific to assure enforcement. See AMERICAN SocImrY
OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADvisoRY SERVICE INFORMATION REP. No. 38, IN-
STALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS As REQUIRED IN SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 15
(1952).
58. This, of course, assumes that the improvements and the standards therefor
are sufficient to assure the health and safety of the community. See notes 123-137 infra
and accompanying text.
59. The F.H.A. estimates that the cost of basic service utilities is usually greater
than 20% of the total cost for the average small dwelling. See MCMIICHAEL, REAL
ESTATE SUBDIVSIONS 135 (1949).
60. One community has, in fact, successfully used this method to control excessive
subdividing since 1927. See SEGOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 521 (1st ed.
1941). See also A1ERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY
SERVICE INFORMATION REP. No. 38, INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS AS RE-
QUIRED IN SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 1 (1952).
61. N.j. REV. STAT. §40:55-13 (Supp. 1950); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW §33.
62. "It is obvious that, if land was swamp or bog and was subdivided for resi-
dential purposes and a map of it offered for approval, the planning board would have
power to reject such a plat. . . ." In re Lake Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 913,
916, 252 N.Y. Supp. 809, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1931). In 1938 the statute was amended to give
specific authority to deal with such situations. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 33.
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example, exposed to periodic flooding or rock slides could be subdivided
only after these faults were remedied, as could probably often be accom-
plished. 63
Finally, at least three states, apparently not satisfied with the
results .achieved indirectly through improvement requirements, have
specifically authorized the denial of subdividing in the "public interest. '6 4
These statutes evidently are intended to make possible direct action
against residential subdividing in excess and in inappropriate areas 65 and
have discarded the zoning-subdivision dichotomy regarding use control.
Notably, the harms associated with these two factors are dissimilar, in
that the former results only in economic instability where the subdivider
installs improvements, while the latter produces slum areas with resultant
harm to health, safety, and general well being of the community.6 6 While
no litigation has arisen involving these statutes," their enactment
accentuates the present need for judicial understanding of the subdi-
vision problem.
Concealing the difficulties that would be encountered in upholding
this legislation are favorable decisions involving street patterns6 s and
improvements.6 9 An examination of the rationale of these decisions
sometimes reflects a distinct lack of understanding with respect to the
63. The Presidents Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership was
informed 'that while such land characteristics as swampy soil and steep hillsides were
secondary causes to slum conditions, such characteristics could be satisfactorily han-
died through the utilization of modern engineering techniques where required by city
planning. PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE ON HOME BUILDING AND HOmE OWNERSHIP, SLUMS,
LARGE-ScALE HOUSING AND DECENTRALIZATION 111, 42-44, quoted in FORD, SLUMS AND
HOUSING 447 (1936).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §9170 (Cum. Supp. 1952); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 58.16.060 (1951); Wis. STAT. § 236.143 (1951). Several other states have statutes
which might readily be construed to afford such broad power. See Appendix, p. 574,
col. IV infra.
65. See MONCHOW, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING 173 (1939); SEaoE, LOCAL PLAN-
NING ADMINISTRATION 522 (1st ed. 1941); AMERICAN SOCIrY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS,
PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE INFORMATION REPORT No. 10, CONSIDERATIONS IN SUB-
DIVISION CONTROL 7 (1950).
66. See notes 6-14 supra and accompanying text.
67. The recognized incident where a commission refused to approve a subdivision
on public interest grounds never reached the courts. See note 85 infra.
68. Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354 (1920); Lewis v.
City Council of Minneapolis, 140 Minn. 433, 434, 168 N.W. 188, 189 (1910) (city
charter involved).
69. Mefford v. City of Tulare, 102 Cal. App. 919, 228 P.2d 847 (1951) (due to
the California court's decisions in this area, however, it is not clear whether the ordi-
nance in question was based upon the California statute or was standing alone) ; Allen
v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 167,
106 N.E. 503, 506 (1952) (case approved of requiring suitably improved streets).
Treated substantially the same by the courts are cases involving dedication of land
for streets. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Ridgefield
Land Co.. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
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values being protected and, therefore, foreshadows possible judicial
defeat for these more comprehensive subdivision statutes controlling
land usage.
Although some statutes have been upheld on a doubtful plat-record-
ing privilege concept,70 where basis for the authority emerges from the
recording system, the only justified foundation is reflected by that line
of cases which rest upon the police power, 71 and recognize that denial
of plat-recording until it is approved is only a means to effectuate that
power.72 Equally questionable are cases where restrictions imposed have
been held -not an exercise of eminent domain73 because the subdivider
"voluntarily subdivided." '74 The proper approach, however, should
involve an ad hoc determination upon a balancing of the interests being
served; if the subdivider is only insignificantly adversely effected while
the community has its health and safety at stake the invasion is probably
justified. 7 Hence only those cases which avowedly rest on the right to
regulate conduct under the police power afford a solid foundation for
prohibiting subdividing.76
70. Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 472-473, 217 N.W. 58, 59-60
(1928) ; Ross v. United States ex rel. Goodfellow, 7 App. D.C. 1, 11 (1895). "
71. Probably the basic police power case in this area is Mansfield and Swett v.
Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225 (1938). See also Brous v. Smith,
304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952); Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357,
111 Atl. 354 (1920).
It is unlikely that subdivision control could be upheld merely because it results
in more pleasing appearances. See Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120
N.J.L. 145, 160, 198 Atl. 225, 233 (1938). However, since unpleasing appearances evi-
dently result in declining neighborhoods, which end in blighted or slum areas, the
question appears to be open. See FoRD, SLUMS AND HOUSING 498 (1936). For an article
considering this same problem as it relates to zoning, see Sayre, Aesthetics and Property
Values, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949).
72. No express recognition of this point is evidenced, but the absence of any
discussion of the plat-recording privilege concept leads to the inference that the courts
have, for the most part, discarded it as a basis for upholding subdivision control.
73. Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941); Ayres
v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Town of Windsor
v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354 (1920) ; Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit,
241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928); Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503
(1952).
74. This distinction, admittedly often a fine one, lies between regulating and
taking for public use. Since the subdivider is engaging in an activity of his own free
will, he is said to be subject to certain restrictions.
75. Reference to a typical case involving improvements readily illustrates this
point. The harm to the subdivider is slight, since he will install the improvements and
pass on the cost to the ultimate consumer. Meanwhile the community has safeguarded
its health and safety. Hence, it is not surprising to find that the courts have con-
sistently upheld action under these statutes as not being an exercise of eminent domair.
76. Obviously, prohibition of subdividing would rest very insecurely upon the plat-
recording privilege concept because there would be, upon denial, no plat to be recorded.
However, even those cases which are based upon the police power, neglecting the
excellent foundation laid in Mansfield v. Swett, 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225 (1938),
which recognized that the restrictions and duties placed upon the subdivider were for
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Since the prohibition statutes are directed towards abuses involving
only residential subdividing, 7 regulation thereunder merely constitutes
a denial of residential subdividing, and hence, residential use. Today,
therefore, both zoning and subdivision control have similar dual purposes,
with an aspect of each concerned with what use shall be made, and
another with how such use is effectuated.78 Accordingly, the similarity
would seem to justify examination of the legal barriers to prohibition
of residential subdividing by reference to that branch of the zoning law
which incorporates decisions involving sparsely developed areas.
The limits of use control are circumscribed by those zoning cases
holding that the city must show7" that there will be a positive demand
for the property as classified within a reasonable time. 0 However,
demonstration by the owner that the property can be put to a more
the public benefit, sometimes reflect undue concern for the benefit to the particular
subdivision and the immediate area. Certainly, all cases repeat the public welfare con-
cept, but sometimes are not consistent throughout the opinion and give over-emphasis
to the instant locality. The outstanding example of this tendency is Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949). Here the best the court
would say for the benefit to public welfare was that "it is no defense to the conditions
imposed in a subdivision map proceeding that their fulfillment will incidentally also
benefit the city as a whole." Ayers v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, supra at
41, 207 P.2d at 7. Indeed, it is not only no defense, it is a primary consideration upon
which to uphold the conditions. Such a decision suggests that subdivision control, like
zoning before it, is still progressing from a device primarily concerned with benefiting
those in the particular area, to one that is ultimately concerned with the effects of the
acts upon the public welfare as a whole. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
Assuredly, the local community and the individual buyer will usually be materially
benefitted, but full realization of the role of subdivision control as a tool of city plan-
ning demands that the public interest generally be determinative. Clearly prohibition
of subdividing could only be upheld on such public benefit basis, for there would not
be existing buyers, or subdivision to benefit.
77. Indeed, the entire subdivision control program has arisen out of abuses regard-
ing residential subdividing. While some statutes make mention of subdividing for
business and industrial purposes, no case has ever arisen involving anything but resi-
dential subdividing. And at the local level the regulations promulgated are normally
orientated only to residential use. The American Society of Planning Officials, which
has the opportunity to carefully examine local regulations stated: "Most subdivision
regulations make no mention of industrial lots. Many of the ordinances are so worded
that their provisions could apply to industrial and commercial subdivisions, but most
often when specific requirements are set forth for lot area, street width, etc., these
requirements are orientated to residential rather than industrial requirements." AMER IcAN
SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE INFORMATION REPORT
No. 10, CONSIDERATIONS IN SUBDIVISION CONTROL 2 (1950).
78. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
79. In Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 685, 1 So.2d 642, 646 (1940),
the court stated that "the mere opinion or belief that a prospective demand will develop
... in the not distant future, as weighed against the concrete fact that it is unfit as it
now stands for the purpose for which it is restricted . . . is not sufficient ... "
80. A leading decision concluded: "An ordinance which permanently so restricts
the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain,
beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of property. . . ." Arverne Bay
Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938).
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profitable use will not suffice to invoke a change."- These limits, applied
to prohibition of residential subdividing, suggest that the city must show
that the subdivider can utilize his land for other than residential subdi-
visions within a reasonable time with only a partial loss of profit. Ideally,
then, .within the above judicially defined limits, the local planning
authority, under prohibition statutes, would often be possessed of two
basically comparable instruments with which to mold land use consistent
with the general welfare. Indeed, certain procedural diversities seemingly
infuse additional significance into their co-existence. Zoning regulates
by marking off appreciable areas, often so large as to invite excessive
residential subdividing, while subdivision control could respond in selected
areas, with approval or denial of relatively diminutive portions, thereby
offering sufficient flexibility for precise reflection of community needs in
the fringe areas.
Unfortunately, this very flexibility, combined with the present
amateurishness of planning commissions, is one of the three factors
which should preclude utilization of statutory authority to prevent subdi-
viding of land for residential use. Such flexibility readily facilitates
abuse of authority by incompetent local boards, whose past records
evidence an undue tendency to compromise due to the pressures inevitably
exerted.8 2
Utilization of prohibition to prevent excessive subdividing encounters
two other serious difficulties. First, assuming that members were impec-
cable, prohibition would necessitate an evaluation that the subdivision,
once complete, would not be salable. Since each subdivision varies in
size, lot dimensions, location, and in overall quality, existence of ample
lots within the community would not necessarily preclude a present
demand for the pending subdivision . 3 Furthermore, the present demand,
even if accurately established, could conceivably fluctuate tremendously
before completion of the subdivision due to considerations emanating
from local, regional, and national affairs.8 4 Second, if the actual distinc-
tion, in this area, between eminent domain and the police power is based
on the relative benefit and harm to the public and individual respectively,
then prevention of excessive residential subdividing rests insecurely on the
police power. Where the alleged harm arises exclusively from excessive
subdividing, once the utility requirement has been met the city can no
81. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, supra note 80.
82. See notes 115-116 infra and accompanying text.
83. See MONcHow, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVIDING 174 (1939); SEGoE, LocAL PLAN-
NING ADMINISTRATION 523-524 (1st ed. 1941).
84. This difficulty is discussed in some detail in relation to city planning generally
in SEaoE, Id. at 67 et seq. (2d ed. 1948).
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longer be burdened with sizable installation expenses; therefore the harm
to the community arises exclusively from the economic instability asso-
ciated with blighted areas.8 5 Meanwhile, the individual harm will be sub-
stantial, since the subdivider is not often in a position to put the land to
other uses.8 6 Indeed, if the city has already zoned the area for residential
use, the individual harm would certainly be sufficient to preclude denial
under the police power.8 7
Power to prevent residential subdividing in inappropriate regions,
near railroads or in industrial areas, presents a nicer question. While the
first consideration, possibility of corruption, remains, the decision that
the subdivision is unsuitably situated does not require as difficult or
subjective a judgment as the determination of "excessive" necessitates.
Furthermore, such prohibition could more readily be upheld as an
exercise of the police power since the community would benefit from
protection against dangers to health and safety, and other slum condi-
tions, while the subdivider might more readily be able to put the area
to industrial use.
Presently, then, with the possible exception of authority to prevent
residential subdividing of inappropriate areas, the statutes requiring
improvements, which also explicitly or implicitly authorize requiring
land which is itself suitable for building purposes, constitute the best
method for combatting the harm-inducing factors associated with
uncontrolled subdividing. However, only thirty-two states have adopted
such improvement statutes 88 and their effective utilization is often
thwarted by deficiencies stemming from various aspects of the legislation
and from inept implementation by the local planning authority.
The most prevalent legislative loop-hole is the ineffective penalty
section, which actually abrogates control. Approval of the planning
85. The only reported instance of a "public interest" statute being employed to
prohibit subdividing occuitred in King County Washington. The board refused to
approve because the land was of such low value that the tax receipts would not cover
the cost of public services, and the county could not afford to improve the streets.
These reasons reflect both the economic instability idea and the more direct drain on
the public treasury from the expenditure of funds to improve the streets. Requiring
the subdivider to install improvements, which would include improving the streets,
would clearly eliminate the latter reason. In addition, this requirement might have
avoided the possible economic instability by inducing the subdivider not to subdivide.
American Society of Planning Officials News Letter, Aug. 1938, p. 67, col. 1.
86. Since excessive subdividing has largely taken place in the outskirts of cities,
the land will probably only be useable for agricultural purposes. It is not likely that
the subdivider will be able to readily resell the land for such use at a profit or to go
into the farming business himself.
87. This land may or may not be zoned, since often the area will be beyond
the city limits, and zoning, like subdividing control, has often rested at the city limits.
If zoned, however, it is most likely that it will be in a residential district.
88. See Appendix, p. 574, col. III, infra.
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authority is, in all statutes, made a condition precedent to recording
of a plat. While the advantages to the seller of being able to transfer
property by reference to a recorded plat are considerable,8 9 the impo-
.sition of burdens such as utility installation and other improvements
often motivate the subdivider to forego the plat device. Accordingly,
many states have imposed additional penalties for failure to comply
with local regulations, in the form of sizable fines, imprisonment, or
both, with power in the city to enjoin the sale.90
The most difficulty arises, however, not because of inadequate
penalties, but rather due to shortcomings in sections which define acts
necessary for a violation. 91 The standard clause, still existing in twenty-
three states, describes a violator as one who sells land by reference to
an unapproved plat, with the further provision that sale by metes and
bounds shall not avoid the penalty.92  The weakness of this widely
adopted penalty section is twofold. First, the burden of producing posi-
tive proof that the subdivider displayed, or made some use of, a plat
89. Once the plat has been recorded, the seller can sell by simply referring to
the lot as "number one in Redacre Subdivision." The possibility of error in descrip-
tion by ulitization of this device is lessened and therefore the possibility of errors
that might cloud the title is reduced.
90. See Appendix, p. 574, col. V, infra.
91. The earliest problem relating to such provisions concerned avoidance of the
statute by merely transferring by metes and bounds. This problem has been elim-
inated in many states by the standard clause, which, of course, incorporated other weak-
nesses, or by the totally improved sections. See notes 92-98 infra, and accompanying
text. Some states, however, still suffer from the metes and bounds problem. Indiana,
whose penalty section is a variation from the usual categories, illustrates such avoid-
ance. The Indiana statute, which could readily be construed to demand approval of
every plat made, has evidently never been so enforced. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3242
(Burns Cum. Supp. 1951). Hence, the subdivider makes a plat for demonstration
purposes, does not have it approved, is not prosecuted for not having it approved, and
avoids any possible prosecution by selling by metes and bounds. Typically, after
discussing reasons for avoidance in Fort Wayne, Indiana, one writer concluded: "At
least one subdivider encountering this situation has held parcels out on a metes and
bounds description, without reference to a definite plat or subdivision." Communica-
tion to the Indiana Law Journal from Gordon Reeves, Associate General Counsel for
tile Li'icoln National Life Insurance Company, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Similarly, in
discussing the situation around a rapidly expanding smaller Indiana city, another writer
stated: "Our second problem which is a legal problem of all of Indiana and that is
subdivisions sold by metes and bounds in order to avoid providing streets, curbs, gutters,
sewers.... ." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Stephen Baker, Execu-
tive Vice President of Columbus, Indiana, Chamber of Commerce. Even if the subdi-
vider were prosecuted for not havint a plat approved, once made, without regard
to how the property was transferred, he could still avoid control by not making a
plat of the subdivision to begin with. See discussion of the standard clause, note 92-94
infra and accompanying text.
92. More specifically, the clause usually reads: anyone, being the owner or agent
of the owner, who negotiates to sell, agrees to sell, or sells any land by reference to,
exhibition of, or by any other use of an unrecorded plat shall be guilty of a violation.
Transfer by metes and bounds shall not avoid the penalty.
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is cumbersome.9 8 Second, the provision cannot readily be construed to
apply in a situation where the subdivider takes the buyer on a first-hand
tour of the subdivision without ever making a plat or map of any type.94
Significantly, in recent years, the exigency for an improved section
has been relieved in fifteen states95 by various clauses which, in addition
to eliminating "reference to a plat," either command the subdivider to
make a plat and have it approved, 96 or demand approval of the subdi-
vision itself.9 7 While the standard clause, with its obvious faults, still
predominates, the newer provisions should provide satisfactory service
where adopted. 98
Another serious defect within the statutes which also serves to annul
control, evolves from attempts to define subdivision.9 9 While many
statutes do not explain the term, thereby necessitating definition by the
local authority, 100 those that do often invite evasion by making the
93. See SEOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 525 (1st ed. 1941).
94. This could often easily be accomplished by the subdivider with satisfastory
results, especially if the subdivider has put through streets of some sort and added a
few fancy street signs.
95. See Appendix, p. 574, col. V, infra.
96. These statutes are of two types. The first type provides that anyone who
subdivides shall first make a plat and have it approved. The other variation says that
before anyone can sell or offer to sell from a subdivision he must make a plat of the
subdivision and have it approved. The only appreciable difference stems from the time
when the violation begins, since there is no violation in the latter clause until he offers
to sell. See Appendix, p. 574, Footnotes L, D, infra.
97. Once again there are two variations within this type of section. The first
type commands the subdivider to obtain approval for the subdivision from the planning
authority before subdividing. The second type requires the subdivider to gain approval
for the subdivision before selling any lot from such subdivision. Hence, the difference
again stems from the time element. See Appendix, p. 574, Footnotes F, 0, infra.
98. No loop-holes are patent within these provisions. The metes and bounds
problem is averted because the method of transfer is irrelevant. Significantly, the
statutes that provide that the subdivider must, before subdividing, gain approval for
the subdivision itself or make a plat and have it approved offer the better solution,
since prosecution can be commenced before any innocent third party buyer enters the
picture. See notes 96-97 supra.
An additional penalty section could, in one form, serve satisfactorily to assure
control over almost all subdividing. This type section provides that any new structure
built facing on a street that is not part of an approved subdivision is subject to legal
action by the municipality. Hence, even a subdivider who subdivided in a state having
the standard penalty section and who had therefore avoided the fine provision by not
making a plat, could still be reached under this section. Militating against employment
of this section, in all but one state where adopted, is the penalty itself. Most statutes
afford authority to have the building condemned and removed if erected in violation
of this section. This provision is quite drastiq and probably should not be utilized
even if local boards were willing. One statute, however, gives power to enjoin the
erection of the building. CONN. GaN. STAT. § 860 (1947). Such power could be most
satisfactorily employed and would also often preclude entry of innocent buyers into
the situation. See Appendix, p. 574, col. VI, infra.
99. See Appendix, p. 574, col. II, infra.
100. Twenty-three states do not define "subdivision" in their statutes. See Appen-
dix, p. 574, col. II, infra. The local planning authority must, therefore, define the term
NOTES
number of parcels into which a piece of land is divided determinative
of the existence of a subdivision. Hence, if the number exceeds two,
as it does in 40% of the statutes, which define the term,10 1 avoidance
of regulation is accomplished by division into one less than the specified
number.10 2
While not facilitating complete avoidance, an additional statutory
imperfection, stemming from the limits of municipal jurisdiction and
regarding the inter-relation of the municipal and county authority, where
both exist, severely hampers realistic regulation. Obviously, limiting the
municipality's jurisdiction to the confines of the incorporated area, as
is done in fifteen statutes,'0 3 precludes any opportunity for a coordinated
attack on illegal subdivision practices in the absence of an active county
planning authority. Accordingly, most statutes give the city planning
commission jurisdiction over outlying areas, varying from one to six
miles and usually limited to three.'0 4 The increased trend away from
the city, coupled with varying development of cities within the state
due to topography, rate of growth, and numerous other factors,10 5
militates against any rigid limitation.10 6 Appropriately, several of the
most recent enactments have afforded city planning commissions juris-
within their regulations. For able advice to local authorities on this problem see:
FEDERAL HOUSING AND HOmE FINANCE AGENCY, SUGGESTED LAND SuBDrvIsioN REGU-
LATIONS 9 (1952).
101. See Appendix, p. 574, col. II, infra.
102. Two state attorney general opinions add little clarification to this problem.
The New York Attorney General concluded that those who file maps with less than
the specified number on several occasions would be covered by the act if the land
involved was contiguous. 1950 OPs. ATTY. GEN. 161 (N.Y.). In Wisconsin, however,
where the statute specified five, the Attorney General concluded one could sell four
a year with impunity. 36 Ors. ATTY. GEN. 185 (Wisc. 1947). This has become one
of the major weaknesses of the Wisconsin statute. See MELLI, SUBDIVISION CONTROL
IN WISCONSIN 25 et seq. (1953).
103. See Appendix, p. 574, col. I, infra. The extent to which cities are confined to
the city limits is clearly defined by a 1950 survey which revealed that of 84 cities with
a population of over 50,000, only 40 had subdivision jurisdiction beyond the city limits.
URBAN LAND INSTITUTF, TC HNICAL BULL TiN No. 13, WHO PAYS FOR UTILITY IN-
STALLATIONS IN NEV RESIDENTIAL ARF-AS 3 (1950).
104. See Appendix, p. 574, col. I, infra.
105. One metropolitan area, Louisville, Kentucky, which is experiencing a surge
of subdivision development, typifies such growth beyond any two or three mile limit.
"[AIll of 25 miles by road from the Court House is a new development, a string
of tiny, new frame houses strung along the road .... Here is a subdivision of the
simplest sort .... Perhaps 1953 will be remembered as the year in which new subdi-
visions were created in larger numbers, farther from the center of town, than in any
year in our history." Courier-Journel, Louisville, March 15, 1953, p. 17, col. 6.
106. Realization of the obvious danger of restricting jurisdiction to a few miles
beyond the city limits is reflected by the present situation in a rapidly growing Indiana
city. "We have no control over the area beyond the two mile limit, therefore shack
towns. Fast operators can buy farm land, cut it up in small lots, sell it and keep
going." Communication to the INDIANA LAw JOURNAL from Stephen Baker, Executive
Vice President of the Columbus, Indiana, Chamber of Commerce.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
diction over all the outlying areas which bear a reasonable relation to
development of the cities.10 7
Adoption in fourteen states of county planning commissions with
jurisdiction over unincorporated areas 08 infuses additional difficulty into
the outlying area problem. Significantly, almost all statutes reflect an
appreciation for the necessity of providing "working agreements" be-
tween the city and county authorities.'0 9 However, even if it were
reasonable to assume the abilities and planning knowledge of the two
groups to be equal, division of what is essentially one problem between
two bodies would still invite unwarranted difficulty."10
While the more frequently appearing statutory faults have been
considered, avoidance of regulatory measures due to other statutory
defects, peculiar to individual statutes, continues." - Such avoidance
demonstrates the desires of numerous subdividers to circumvent control
if at all possible, and, accordingly, illustrates the ever-pressing need to
take cognizance of these statutory mistakes and correct them.
107. See Appendix, p. 574, col. I, infra.
108. See Appendix, p. 574, col. I, infra.
109. Typically, where the city has jurisdiction over a specified area beyond the
city limits and the county authority, upon creation, has jurisdiction to the city limits,
some provision must be made for which board's authority shall prevail. Most statutes
afford preference to the county commission. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-735 (Burns
1951); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 19-2927 (Supp. 1951); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 1462 (1951).
Hence, where the county has acted under the state statute and created a planning
authority, the county will, in almost all cases, exercise jurisdiction to the city limits.
110. Establishment of a commission having subdivision jurisdiction around each
metropolitan area, whose membership represents both the county and the city, appears
to be the best solution. The duplication of time and effort necessitated by two boards,
even where their activities are ideally integrated is inexcusable. Kentucky has estab-
lished, by statute, probably the most satisfactory integration of both county and city
interests, by allowing any first class city and the county in which it is situated to create,
by agreement, a city-county commission. The members are equally drawn from among
the city and county. Ky. Rrv. STAT. §§ 100.031 to 100.036 (1946).
However, the stigma of county-city division remains to muddle the subdivision
control program. Two different bodies have veto power over the rulings of the planning
commission depending on whether the ruling involves land inside or outside of the
city limits. "Because of the arbitrary city limits separating city and county property,
the rulings of the Fiscal Court and the alderman may cause a serious conflict over
the development of a single unit of property, and make the orderly development of
an area impossible." Louisville Courier-Journal, March 16, 1953, p. 4, col. 2.
111. Exemplifying such a situation is Louisville, Kentucky, where much wildcat
subdividing has taken place in the past few years. See Louisville Courier-Journal
March 15, 1953, p. 17, col. 2. One lawyer, who has testified before the Planning and
Zoning Commission regarding such avoidance, outlined the statutory loop-hole which
facilitated such action. "But in 1948 someone read the Enabling Act closely and found
that pursuant to the statute . . . the zoning Enforcement Officer could issue building
permits for residences fronting on 'Easements of Record.' . . . Builders . . . immediately
seized this opening . . . dedicated a private road or easement, improved it and sold
lots...." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Stephen Smith, Jr.,
Attorney at Law.
NOTES
Certainly, no state can be assured of satisfactory control without
an adequately devised statute; yet, a program established under a perfect
statute cannot succeed without a realistic planning authority imbued
with the will and necessary knowledge to attain the desired result. How-
ever, with practically every state having a statute in force, a 1950
survey reveals that only fifty per-cent of the cities over 10,000 have
availed themselves of the right to create a planning commission.' 12
Therefore, the evident and basic need in one-half of the United States
is to establish the necessary local authority.
Even in those communities which have availed themselves of the
statutory authority by creating planning commissions, the control pro-
gram is often inefficacious. This futility stems from three factors:
(1) failure to fully employ the statutory powers by not promulgating
regulations requiring the authorized improvements; n13 (2) loop-holes
112. This survey, which included 1,228 cities of over 10,000 population, found
that 646 had created an official planning agency. See INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS
ASSOCIATION, 1951 MUNICIPAL YEAR BooK 264 e seq. Westchester County of New
York probably represents the most highly controlled area in the United States. Hugh
Pomeroy of the Westchester County Planning Authority testified before the Con-
gressional Joint Committee on Housing, which had cited Westchester as having one of
the most advanced suburban development plans in the nation. He reported that the
Planning Board powers generally embraced 79% of the area and 95% of the population,
with 72% of the area and 87% of the population subject to subdivision control.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1948, p. 60, col. 1.
113. Several studies have been made involving the requirements of communities
under improvement statutes. In 1940 an extensive study of local regulations resulted
in a book dealing in part with this question. See LAUTNER, SUBDIVSlION REGULATIONS
(1941). This survey, which involved some 215 cities which required some improve-
ments, produced these results: 57% required grading, 24% surfacing and paving, 10%
curbs, 7% gutters, 19% sidewalks, 43% storm drainage, 25% sanitary sewer, 31% water
supply, 3% street signs. The American Society of Planning Officials conducted a similar
survey in 1952 of cities over 10,000 population, all of which had adopted such require-
ments since 1940. This report produced the following results: 85% required grading,
42% surfacing, 36% paving, 41% curbs, 30% gutters, 53% sidewalks, 55% storm sewers.
60% sanitary sewers, 55% water supply, 11% street signs, 10% gas mains, 8% elec-
tricity, 10% fire hydrants, 12% street lighting fixtures and 25% street trees. AmERICAN
SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE INFORMIATION REPORT
No. 38, INSTALLMENT OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS AS REQUIRED IN SUBDIVISION REGU-
LATIONS (1952). Finally, the Urban Land Institute conducted a very extensive survey,
in 1950, which sought the requirements of 178 cities of over 50,000 population. This
survey received answers from 98 cities and the results were as follows: 85%
required grading, 75% paving, 87% curb and gutter, 90% sidewalks, 60% water mains,
75o sanitary sewers, 74% storm sewers. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN
No. 13, WHO PAYS FOR STREET AND UTILITY INSTALLATIONS IN NEw RESIDENTIAL
AREAS 3 (1950).
Several conclusions are evident from these extensive surveys. First, there has been
a sizable increase of requirements since 1940. This is undoubtedly due to the increase
of legislation allowing improvement requirements, coupled with more action by the
local planning authorities. Second, many local communities which have authority to
require improvements simply are not writing such requirements into their local regu-
lations with sufficient consistency. One-third to one-fourth do not even require water
supply and sanitary sewers. Third, by comparing the last two surveys it is apparent
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within the regulations, as within the statutes;114 (3) even with ideal
regulations, the commissions often tend to compromise"-' and fail to
enforce the program by refusing to invoke the sanctions afforded.'1 6
Such weaknesses evidently result from two primary considerations: lack
of understanding and belief in the subdivision program, 1 7 and the
paucity of funds expended to aid the planning authority through the
creation of an adequate planning staff."18
that the larger cities, 50,000 and over, are much more active in demanding these
improvements.
114. E.g., "[t]he Subdivision Control Regulations are loosely drawn. The final
opening of the door to Wildcat Subdividing is found in the opening paragraph, wherein
it is said: 'The following regulations shall apply . . . to the dedication to public use
of any street, road .... However, these regulations shall not apply . . . where . . .
no dedication to public use . . . is involved.'" Communication to the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL from Stephen Smith, Attorney at Law. The above regulations were part
of the regulations for Jefferson County, Kentucky, of which Louisville is a part.
115. The American Planning Institute stated: "'In some localities there are
existing laws which, if administrated thoroughly and with vigor, would prevent some
of the evils indicated herein, and would improve some of the undesirable conditions.
* * * But it may be admitted that blanning boards frequently, and their advisors too
often, show an undue tendency to compromise. The result is that it has become
increasingly difficult to devise a co-ordinated comprehensive plan, and to pursue con-
sistently the development of its details or the effective execution of its parts.'" State-
ment issued by AMERICAN PLANNING INSTITUTE, quoted in MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE
SuBDIvIsIoNs 25 (1949). This tendency to compromise is vigorously corroborated by
one authority in the field, who, basing his conclusions on numerous interviews and
an analysis of planning commissions, determined that this tendency to compromise
resulted partly from the conservative character of the planning commissions' members.
Businessmen, realtors, lawyers, and architects comprised almost 80% of the mem-
bership. See WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN GOVERNMENT C. 5 (1st
ed. 1941). Notably, however, the real estate industry is making every effort to place
more representatives on the commissions. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1949, p. 41, col. 1.
116. One writer, after a very recent and extensive survey of conditions in Wis-
consin, concluded: "A second reason for the widespread violation of the platting law
is the lack of enforcement of it. In most cases no attempt is made . . . to do anything
about known violations of the law." MELLI, SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN WISCONSIN 29
(1953). Similarly, one writer stated in relation to the Indiana situation: "Some
resistance is apparent. This may be due to a lesser degree of understanding of the
subject or to weaker enforcement provisions." There exists "deliberate violation of
the regulations, with the hope that such violation will not be disclosed or that no
action will be taken." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Frank
Dunn, Vice-President of American United Life Insurance Co., Indianapolis, Indiana.
117. After an extensive study of planning commissions one writer stated: "The
commission member who does appreciate the broader aspects of planning, particularly
its social and economic implications, is an exception, although there are a number who
see well beyond its present confines." WALKER, THE PLANNING FUNCTION IN UR13AN
GOVERNMENT 157-158 (1st ed. 1941).
118. It is generally accepted that the constructive work of a planning commission
depends on the efforts of the planning staff. This staff consists of city planning
engineers and the necessary clerical assistants. One of the most authoritative books
in the field suggests the following budgets for cities of various sizes: 250,000-1,000,000
pop.-25,000-30,000; 50,000-100,000 pop.-7,000-10,000; 10,000-50,000 pop.--$4,000-
5,000. SEGOE, LOCAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 45 (2d ed. 1948). The most recent statis-
tics available on actual expenditures for staff assistance reveal a sorry tale. In a 1950
NOTES
Assuredly, the weaknesses of subdivision control exhibit them-
selves throughout the program. Such inadequacies are patently evident
only because of the number of subdividers who successfully avoid control
and thus subdivide in an economically and socially undesirable fashion.
Two divergent pressures motivate such avoidance, one completely selfish
and the other ostensibly most commendable.
Certainly, the profit motive, which ran rampant during the twenties'
boom,"19 continues to induce the irresponsible subdivider to evade regula-
tion. 20 Realistically, such individuals will always do so if more profit
results thereby; however, certain trends within the industry,' 2 ' coupled
with enactment in some states of statutes providing against fraudulent
practices, 22 have substantially reduced the number of completely irre-
survey of 646 cities over 10,000 population, with planning commissions, only 248 reported
expenditures of $1,000 or more. In fact 41 cities with populations over 25,000 reported
no expenditures at all. INTERNATIONAL CITV MANAGERS AssocIATIoN, MuNIcIPAL YEAR
BooK 265 et seq. (1951).
These figures, when compared with the suggested minimum expenditures, reflect
little appreciation for the affirmative aspects of planning. See also WALKER, THE
PLANNING FUNCTION IN URBAN GOVERNMENT 158 (1st ed. 1941). Indeed, one planning
official described the current situation in New York City as follows: "All I can tell
you is that such regulation simply does not exist here. For a while, the Planning
Commission was engaged in making a start on subdivision control, and a very good
set of regulations were drawn up for that purpose. However, my understanding is
that not one application has ever been processed under these regulations; and changes
in the official map of streets are really made in the various Borough Presidents'
offices and in effect merely recorded by the Planning Commission. I have never found
exactly what the reason for this is, but it is easy to guess-shortage of staff in the
Planning Commission.... ." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Norman
Williams, Jr., Director Division of Planning, Department of City Planning, New
York City, New York.
119. See note 34 Yupra.
120. The industry recognizes that such irresponsible operators continue to do
business. See note 37 supra.
121. The subdivision business has become more than a matter of selling vacant
lots. In recent years the very significant trend of selling a complete home has forced
the subdivider to have more capital available and continue the subdividing of a tract
of land over a more appreciable time period. This requires a more reliable operator,
and minimizes fly-by-night activities. See MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS
1 (1949).
122. E.g., ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 67-1701 to § 67-1740 (1939); CAL. Bus.-PROF. CODE
ANN. § 11010 to § 11021. These statutes provide generally that lands to be subdivided
shall be registered with a state agency before being offered for sale. Included in the
data must be the name of owner, specifications of the subdivision, evidence of title
the subdivider holds, and terms and conditions of the sales the subdivider is going to
make. The state authority can then investigate this data. The investigation must show
that the subdivider is able to give good title. If the finding is negative the state agency
can prohibit the sales and fine the subdivider. Certainly these statutes should serve
to reduce fraudulent practices within the industry and raise the standards of the
subdivision business. The California statute was upheld as constitutional in In re
Sidebotham, 12 Cal.2d 434, 85 P.2d 453 (1938). See also Murphy v. San Gabriel Mfg.,99 Cal. App.2d 365, 222 P.2d 85 (1949). The impact of this California act was severely
lessened, however, by a case which construed the loosely drawn statutory definition of
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sponsible subdividers. Generally, the industry has realized that the
"jerry-builder" casts ill-repute upon the entire business, in addition to
severely reducing the number of its prospective buyers by under-selling
the ethical subdivider. But avoidance by reputable members, which con-
tinues in addition to evasion by "wildcat" subdividers, is often excused
by the industry on the grounds that the number of improvements
required or the quality standards established make it impossible to satisfy
low cost housing needs and comply with regulations. 123
the term subdivision as encompassing only unimproved land. People v. Embassy
Realty Ass'n, 73 Cal. App.2d 901, 167 P.2d 797 (1946).
These statutes, which are clearly aimed at assuring valid title, should not be
confused with the usual subdivision control enabling statute. See Note, 65 HARV.
L. REV. 1226, 1236 (1952), where the writer cites the Sidebothiam case to illustrate
a penalty exacted under the usual type of subdivision control statute.
123. This conflict is evidenced by those speaking for the organized industry.
"Their [progressive subdividers'] chief quarrel with these regulations has been directed
against those cities which have adopted excessive provisions or unreasonable require-
ments." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Max Wehrly, Executive
Director of the Urban Land Institute. Similarly, A National Real Estate Board
Panel Discussion concluded: "Impractical, inelastic and idealistic city planning in
many parts of the country have tended to retard normal growth." N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1949, p. 41, col. 1. Finally, one of the best books written from the subdividers'
view-point concluded: "If cheaper dwellings are to be provided something must be
done in most cities to provide less expensive types of improvements so that lots may
be retailed to workingmen at a price they can afford to pay." MCMICHA, REA.
ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS, 136 (1949).
More particular instances are continually evidencing themselves. One writer, com-
menting on the situation in Indiana, stated: "The attitude of subdividers toward
regulatory restrictions, limitations, etc., seems at all times to be flavored with the cost
of their enterprise and the estimated effect of such regulations on the salability of
their product." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Frank Dunn, Vice-
President of American United Life Insurance Co., Indianapolis, Indiana. Another
writer, after extensive research, concluded that compliance with regulations in Wiscon-
sin is considered a severe economic burden. MELLI, SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN WIS-
CONSIN 29 (1953).
This conflict is more vividly evidenced in the local communities where overly
exacting requirements are said to exist. An attorney from Louisville, Kentucky, who
had testified before the local planning commission on this problem, wrote: "These
builders and developers are not altogether to blame for taking advantage of these
laxities of the governing regulations. Complying with all of the requisites of the
Subdivision Regulations makes it virtually impossible to develop an approved subdi-
vision wherein homes could be built to sell in the lower income brackets." Communi-
cation to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Stephen Smith, Attorney-at-Law. Another
attorney, in discussing the Fort Wayne, Indiana, situation wrote: "One subdivider
estimated the costs of improvements . . . to run approximately ten times the cost of
the land." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Gordon Reeves, Asso-
ciate General Counsel for the Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., Fort Wayne,
Indiana. Similarly Kokomo, Indiana, recently passed a new ordinance, in response
to complaints by subdividers, making sidewalk construction mandatory unless such
construction was an "undue hardship." See Indianapolis News, April 8, 1953, p. 17,
col. 8.
Certainly, this problem is current and very much alive in many communities
throughout the United States today.
NOTES
Undoubtedly, in some instances, planning commissions have estab-
lished requirements 124  and quality standards over and above those
necessary, 25 thereby precluding purchase by those of the lower income
brackets, who comprise two-thirds to three-fourths of today's buyers. 1 26
Yet subdivider's complaints, one being that sidewalks were "very nice
but not necessary, '1 -2 7 often reflect little apparent appreciation for sound
development policies. Obviously, sidewalks are necessary to provide safe
play facilities for children, 28 but are sidewalks on only one side sufficient,
and if so, how wide must they be and of what materials should they be
constructed ?
Intelligent examination of the supposed conflict between low cost
housing and improvement requirements must be resolved by weighing
the social desirability of the ends of subdividing against the admitted
benefits of low cost housing. Improvement requirements indirectly limit
residential subdividing in excess and in inappropriate areas if they con-
stitute a sizable portion of the total home cost. Since compliance with
even the most minimal requirements, upon which all would agree,-
street grading, water mains and sanitary sewers-often comprises as
much as twenty per-cent of the total home cost,' 29 the indirect influence
exerted by more costly improvements and high standards upon excessive
and inappropriate residential subdividing quickly reaches the point of
rapidly diminishing returns and will therefore be negligible.
124. The list of requirements, each of which requires standards, that is incor-
porated into a city's regulations may be a sizable one, including grading and surfacing
of streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, sanitary sewers, storm sewers, water mains, gas
mains, electric lines, street signs, street lighting fixtures, street trees, and fire hydrants.
125. A survey made by the Regional Planning Association of New York, in which
94 municipalities in 17 counties surrounding New York City were contacted, found
that 40.8% of the municipalities require the developer to plant street trees. American
City, March, 1952, p. 7, col. 2. Undoubtedly typical of this type of requirement is the
ordinance for White Plains, New York, which states that "'street trees shall be
of approved species and their location approved by the Dept. of Public Works.'"Quoted in AMERICAN SocITy OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SRWICE
INFORMATION REPORT No. '38, INSTALLATION OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS AS REQUIRED
IN SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 15 (1952). While these trees undoubtedly add to the
pleasing atmosphere of the development, it is certainly questionable whether they are
prerequisites to safe and healthful living. Notably, the nation-wide surveys reveal
only a very small percentage of planning commissions requiring trees. See note 113
supra.
126. Buyers able to pay 6,000 to 10,000 dollars for completed homes embrace
% to 4 of the market. MCMICHAFL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISION 109 (1949).
127. See Indianapolis News, April 8, 1953, p. 17, col. 8.
128. One former planning official, in fact, assumes that sidewalks are absolutely
necessary, and argues against the narrowing of widths. He believes that narrowing
widths would overdo economy by sacrificing the safety of the children who will soon
be playing there. See Blucher, News Letter of American Society of Planning Officials,
quoted in American City, July, 1951, p. 111, col. 1.
129. See MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISION 135 (1949).
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Hence the problem revolves around the improvements themselves
as they relate to socially desirable growth. Included among the interests
being assured through the installation of improvements are health, safety,
and aesthetic 130 considerations. In the effort to furnish low cost housing,
those requirements primarily directed towards aesthetic values may be
eliminated. A compromise on the necessity for the other improvements
would be pseudo-economy and would severely threaten the health and
safety of the inhabitants thereby issuing an invitation to slums.' 3 '
After the specific improvements have been determined, the more
difficult task of establishing quality standards remains. Basically a
major step toward solution of standard problems could be achieved by
relating the quality of improvements to the actual needs of the subdivision
through the adoption of a grading system, as suggested recently by the
F.H.H.F'.A.132  Such gradings reflect the density of population in the
subdivision, and, accordingly, the necessary specifications. While such
flexibility has been achieved regarding street widths and surfacing
requirements, in some areas, 33 adoption of this essential procedure in
relation to other improvements is lacking..3 4
Once such a grading system was established, the planning authority
would encounter the problem of determining standards within each
classification. Notably, the additional cost necessitated by higher stand-
ards sometimes only represents a slight fractional increase in total home
cost.' 35 This slight saving when balanced against increased maintenance
130. See note 71 supra.
131. The subdivision industry evidently realizes that installation of the basic
improvements cannot be questioned. Hence, the Executive Director of the Urban Land
Institute, in listing some of the complaints of subdividers against local regulations,
did not mention one that was directed at an improvement itself. Rather the com-
plaints dealt exclusively with the specifications or standards for the improvements.
Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Max Wehrly, Executive Director
of the Urban Land Institute. See note 32 supra. Similarly, McMichael directs criticism
at the standards, rather than at the improvements. See MCMIcHAEL, REAL ESTATE
SUBDIVISIONS 136 (1949).
132. Four grades are suggested: (1) apartment, row house, and similar multi-
family residential types; (2) one-family detached dwellings with typical lot widths
of ... ft.; (3) country homes with typical lot widths greater than (2) above; (4)
commercial industrial and other types. Each of the four grades are given a different
set of specifications by the local planning authority. FEDERAL HOUSING AND HOME
FINANCE AGENCY, SUGGESTED LAND SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS 27-29 (1952).
133. This has resulted from recognition of the obvious fact that all streets will
not be required to carry the same traffic load. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING
OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE INFORMATION REPORT No. 38, INSTALLATION
OF PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS AS REQUIRED tN SUBDISION REGULATIONS 7 (1952).
134. A very few communities have accomplished such flexibility in relation to
various requirements. The Stanford, Conn., regulation concerning sidewalks states:
"'Sidewalks of concrete shall be provided in developments designed to provide for a
density in excess of five families per acre.'" Quoted in Id. at 13.
135. The Home Builders Institute in Los Angeles sought certain adjustments
NOTES
cost and more rapid decline of the buyer's property value1 36 invites
caution and thorough examination before acceding to demands for lower
standards.137
Amelioration of the presently confused control process can only be
accomplished by the combined efforts of the legislature, local planning
authority, subdivision industry, immediate buyer and interested citizens.
The reappearing theme of ignorance among all groups regarding the
necessity of planning to prevent materialization of problems now facing
many cities, suggests that a thorough job of education is needed regarding
the preventive role of subdivision control to gain essential interest and
support.13s Actually, a surprisingly good start has been achieved through
in standards which included: (1) eliminate cement sidewalks and gutters and install
macadam rolled gutters; (2) 40 ft. instead of 50-60 ft. plots; (3) reduce street widths
from 34 to 26 ft.; (4) reduce paving requirements; (5) eliminate soil tests and
grading plans for drainage. The Home Builders stated that such reductions would
cut the costs $1289 per acre. The Los Angeles Daily News noted, however, that this
would amount to a "saving" of only $148 per lot. Daily News, Los Angeles, Cal., 1948,
p. 6, quoted in GALLIoN, THE URBAN PATTERN, 260-261 (1950).
136. A Congressional Committee on Housing in a 1948 report, stated: "But some-
times developers and municipal authorities are not quick to recognize the long term
cost and depreciation savings which result from careful development practices. If
maintenance costs are to be reduced, construction standards on improvements will
have to be raised.... There is no question that the value of good street improve-
ments accruing to a home property is much greater than the actual expense of installa-
tions. The lending institutions have proved this to their satisfaction." H.R. Doc. No.
647, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1948). See also Hughes, What's Required for Mainte-
nance-Free Streets, American City, Dec. 1950, p. 102, col. 1.
137. Contrarily, complaints which stem from the imposition of standards which
are based on the need to supply areas beyond the subdivision, with water for example,
are legitimate. Here the city, which charges a flat rate for water service, is requiring
the developer and ultimately the consumer to install a capital improvement upon which
the city often receives profits. Apparently only about 40% of cities requiring improve-
ments have realized this, and have paid part of the cost of water main installation.
See URaAN LAND INSTITUTE, TECHNICAL BULLETIN No. 13, WHo PAYS FOR STREET
AND UTILITY INSTALLATION IN NEW RESIDENTIAL AREA 5 (1950).
Even as to specifications necessitated by the demands of outlying areas, but from
which the city receives no direct revenue, the city should furnish the additional expendi-
tures required. The social interest in facilitating the erection of low cost housing,
coupled with the direct benefit other areas will receive from the imposition of these
standards, is sufficient to require the community's contribution to the cost involved.
See note 32 mpra.
138. Lee Cooper, real estate editor of the New York Times, speaking before the
National Association of Real Estate Boards, vividly pointed out this lack of under-
standing: "One reason why American cities are paying such a high price for unsound
and haphazard growth is that almost without exception, official planning agencies have
failed to recognize the need for gaining in advance the support of their community
and have failed to provide the machinery for education of the public of the value of
planning projects .... Real estate men and developers themselves have not been properly
impressed with the dollar and sense value of planning for permanence. . . . Under
proper leadership the man in the street will come to demand and get something better
than minimum shelter as the background for a stronger and happier people." Address
by Lee Cooper, quoted in N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1949, p. 41, col. 1. See also Kenneth
Vinsel, City Planning, AmERiCAN PLANNING AND Civic ANNUAL 102-103 (1951);
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the inclusion of city planning as a course in many high schools 3 9 and
numerous colleges, together with citizen participation programs in
various cities. 140 Additionally, the organized industry is making some
effort to educate the subdivider.'
4
'
More immediately, however, legislatures in almost every state are
confronted with an opportunity to eliminate one or more weaknesses of
their statutory scheme, and in sixteen states can significantly better their
program by enacting improvement statutes. While faults stemming from
penalty sections, jurisdictional clauses, and definitional phrases invoke
the most difficulty, presence of the ever-searching evader necessitates con-
stant scrutiny by the legislatures of existing improvement statutes for
technical loop-holes. Besides similar problems of ineffectively drawn
regulations, the necessity for constantly enforcing the authority afforded
by the statutes demands consideration by the local commissions. The
dire need in one-half of the cities, which precludes effective control,
evolves simply from the failure of the local community to avail itself
of the statutory program.
A faultless improvement statute, which explicitly or implicitly
includes power to correct land impairments, ideally effectuated, today
presents the best means for combatting the factors-inherent land impair-
ments, inappropriate surroundings, lack of improvements, excessive sub-
dividing-which induce the social and economic harms associated with
uncontrolled subdividing. At best, however, such statutes, while indirectly
preventing residential subdividing in excess and in inappropriate areas
cannot, especially in boom conditions, adequately cope with these factors
since they operate only indirectly through financial pressure. Hence, the
question arises, clearly suggested by the three "public interest" statutes,
as to whether subdivision control can be utilized to directly attack these
factors by use control.
Melville Branch, Focus for Urban Planning, 23 LAND ECONOMICS 228 (1947) ; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1950, p. 31, col. 1.
139. A 1951 survey of 68 cities, with a population of over 100,000, disclosed that
31 had included city planning in the public school curriculum. James Short, City
Planning Education in Public Schools, American City, July, 1951, p. 102-, col. 1.
140. See SEGOE, LocAL PLANNING ADMINISTRATION 57 (2d ed. 1948); Marwood
Rupp, Citizen Community Councils Help, MINNESOTA MUNICIPALITIES 75-77 (1950);
American City, Feb., 1951, p. 87, col. 1.
141. Education by the industry centers on presenting to the subdivider "standards
which the leaders in the land development and building industry feel are desirable
and reasonable in obtaining sound residential development." Communication to the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from Max Wehrly, Executive Director of the Urban Land
Institute. Accordingly, the Urban Land Institute has prepared for the National Asso-
ciation of Home Builders two reference books for the subdivider, THE COMMUNITY
BUILDERS HANDBOOK and THE HoMiE BUILDERS MANUAL FOR LAND DEVELOPMENT. For
a further discussion on educating the subdivider see MCMICIIAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDI-
VISIONS 19 et seq. (1949).
NOTES 573
The subjective evaluation required by commissions, which are often
susceptible to pressure, precludes satisfactory procedural operation for
regulation of excessive subdividing. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, in
the usual case, the balancing of the interests could result in action under
the police power, rather than eminent domain. The procedural objections
to denial because of incompatible surroundings are similar although,
perhaps, a less subjective evaluation is required; this, coupled with the
stronger public interest, health and safety as compared with economic
stability in excessive subdividing, suggests that utilization of this device
might afford satisfactory results. However, while these problems are
often associated with subdividing, they probably result from the lack of
zoning, especially in areas beyond the city limits, or from ineffectually
drawn zoning regulations. Therefore, due to the more objective pro-
cedures involved, rectification of zoning weaknesses presents the better
means of attack on residential subdividing in excess and, to a slightly
lesser extent, in undesirable surroundings.
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